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TORT LAW
I. MODIFIED FORM OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ADOPTED
In Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court adopted the comparative negligence doctrine and thereby abol-
ished the defense of contributory negligence as a total bar to a plain-
tiff's recovery. In a brief opinion the court held that "a plaintiff in a
negligence action may recover damages if his or her negligence is not
greater than that of the defendant.
' 2
Gladys Nelson died when her vehicle collided with the back of a
Concrete Supply Company tractor trailer truck driven by John Clink-
scales. The truck was on the entrance ramp of an interstate highway
waiting to merge when the accident occurred. Rick Nelson, personal
representative of the estate of Mrs. Nelson, commenced a negligence
action to recover damages for Mrs. Nelson's death. The trial judge re-
fused Nelson's request for a jury charge on the law of comparative neg-
ligence. Following a jury verdict for the defendants, Nelson appealed.
3
The supreme court found that Clinkscales was not negligent as a
matter of law" and affirmed the trial court's decision.5 The supreme
court could have disposed of the case on this ground alone, but appar-
ently decided that Nelson was the appropriate case in which to adopt
comparative negligence in South Carolina.6 The supreme court's deci-
sion makes South Carolina the forty-fifth state to adopt comparative
negligence in one form or another.7
1. 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991).
2. Id. at 784.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 784 n.1 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-600 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
5. Id. at 784.
6. Five years prior to Nelson, the supreme court indicated that it would rule on
the question of comparative negligence if properly brought before it and if the legislature
did not act first. See Langley v. Boyter, 286 S.C. 85, 87, 332 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1985) (per
curiam). The Langley court put the legislature on notice that it might adopt comparative
negligence if the legislature did not act. The court stated that the "issue must await the
permission of this Court before a change in this basic, well-established law is brought
about, unless the Legislature acts on the matter beforehand." Id. The General Assembly
has yet to act.
7. For a list of the statutes and decisions that have adopted the doctrine of com-
parative negligence in other states, see Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162, 175 n.11, 325
S.E.2d 550, 557 n.11 (Ct. App. 1984), quashed per curiam, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100
(1985). Delaware adopted comparative negligence after the Langley court compiled its
list. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1990).
1
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The Nelson court provided three basic guidelines on how compar-
ative negligence will be employed in South Carolina. First, it adopted
the modified "not greater than" form of comparative negligence.8 Sec-
ond, it directed that "the plaintiff's recovery shall be reduced in pro-
portion to the amount of his or her negligence."" Finally, it stated that
"[i]f there is more than one defendant, the plaintiff's negligence shall
be compared to the combined negligence of all defendants." 10
Under the modified version of comparative negligence adopted in
Nelson, a plaintiff may recover as long as the percentage of fault at-
tributed to him or her is not greater than that of all defendants."
Therefore, if a court determines that the plaintiff is more than fifty
percent at fault, he or she is barred from any recovery for damages.
The supreme court did not explain the reasons for its rejection of
the pure form of comparative negligence. However, criticism of the
pure form can be found in Langley v. Boyter,12 which the court cited in
Nelson for the "history and merits of comparative negligence."13 Chief
Judge Sanders, who wrote the unanimous court of appeals decision,
criticized the pure form because it allows a plaintiff that is the most at
fault in causing an accident to recover damages. 4 This reasoning fails
to explain why it is unfair for a plaintiff that has suffered a loss of one
hundred dollars to seek forty dollars from a defendant that caused
forty percent of the loss. Also, in multiple-defendant cases the plaintiff
could be most at fault and still recover under the "not greater than"
approach.15 Finally, in an accident in which both parties are injured,
the plaintiff that is more than fifty percent at fault not only would be
8. See Nelson, 399 S.E.2d at 784. For discussions on the various forms of compar-
ative negligence, see UNiF. CoMPARATvE FAULT ACT, prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp.
1991); V. SCHWARTZ, CoMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE §§ 3.1-3.5 (2d ed. 1986); Commentary, A
Call for the Adoption of Comparative Negligence in South Carolina, 31 S.C.L. REv. 757,
774-82 (1980).
9. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d at 784. This reduction in recovery is a normal application of
the doctrine of comparative negligence. See, e.g., UNiv. CoummulvE FAULT ACT § 1(a),
12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1991).
10. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d at 784 (citing Elder v. Orluck, 511 Pa. 402, 515 A.2d 517
(1986)).
11. Id.
12. 284 S.C. 162, 325 S.E.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984), quashed per curiam, 286 S.C. 85,
332 S.E.2d 100 (1985).
13. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
14. Langley, 284 S.C. at 188, 325 S.E.2d at 565 (citing Lamborn v. Phillips Pac.
Chem. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 701, 575 P.2d 215 (1978) (en banc)).
15. For example, suppose there are two defendants, an insolvent defendant who is
40% at fault and a solvent defendant who is 20% at fault. Under the "not greater than"
approach adopted by the Nelson court, the plaintiff who is 40% at fault could recover
from the solvent defendant who is only 20% at fault because the plaintiff's fault is not
greater than the combined fault of all the defendants. See Nelson, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
1991]
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denied recovery, but also would be required to pay for a portion of the
defendant's damages on the crosscomplaint. In this scenario the plain-
tiff would be better off under contributory negligence.
Nelson applies only to causes of action arising on or after July 1,
1991.18 The court, in effect, provided the General Assembly one last
opportunity to enact a comparative negligence statute.
17
If the General Assembly enacts a comparative negligence statute,
it will likely address many of the issues not addressed by the supreme
court in Nelson. Some of these issues include: (1) Whether awards will
be setoff against each other when both parties are entitled to recover;18
(2) whether a right of contribution exists when two or more parties are
liable upon the same claim and, if so, whether the contribution will be
pro rata or according to degree of fault;19 (3) whether, in the case of
multiple defendants, one defendant will be liable for all of the plain-
tiff's award if the other defendants are unable to pay their equitable
shares;20 (4) whether one party's recklessness will result in total recov-
ery for the other party or will simply be a factor in determining degree
of fault;21 and (5) whether comparative negligence will be applied in
strict liability cases.
22
To alleviate some of the uncertainty brought about by the Nelson
decision, the trial lawyer can look to other jurisdictions that already
have resolved the issues. Additionally, the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act"3 is an excellent guide for applying the doctrine of comparative
fault, both in its pure and modified forms. Therefore, regardless of the
action taken by the General Assembly, the brevity of the Nelson deci-
16. Id.
17. The General Assembly did not adopt a statutory framework before July 1,
1991. At the time of this writing the General Assembly was considering a comparative
negligence statute, but it has not taken any formal action.
18. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1991) (generally
prohibiting setoff); see generally Phillips, The Case for Judicial Adoption of Compara-
tive Fault in South Carolina, 32 S.C.L. REv. 295, 304-05 (1980) (discussing setoff under
the "not-greater-than" approach).
19. See UNn'. CoMPARATrvE FAULT AcT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 52 (Supp. 1991) (authorizing
contribution based on "each person's equitable share of the obligation"). Contribution
among tortfeasors in South Carolina is currently by a pro rata sharing. South Carolina
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-38-20 to -40 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990).
20. See UNn'. COMPARATV FAULT AcT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 48 (Supp. 1991) (authoriz-
ing the court to reallocate any uncollectible portion of the judgment among the other
parties).
21. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, §§ 5.1-5.5 (discussing intentional,
reckless, and grossly negligent conduct).
22. See generally id. §§ 12.1-12.8 (discussing products liability and strict liability
under comparative negligence).
23. UNIF. CoMPARATIVE FAULT AcT §§ 1-11, 12 U.L.A. 41-58 (Supp. 1991).
[Vol. 43
3
et al.: Tort Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
TORT LAW
sion has not left practitioners in South Carolina without any direction.
E. Scott Sanders
II. EcONoMIc Loss RULE REJECTED IN ASBESTOS REMOVAL CASES
In Kershaw County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum
Co.24 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the economic loss
rule, which precludes "tort liability for a product defect if the damage
suffered by a plaintiff is only to the product itself,"25 is inapplicable to
a negligence action against the manufacturer of a product that contains
asbestos if the plaintiff offers proof that the product damaged other
property.2 By affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict on the negligence cause of action, the court
effectively eliminated the application of the economic loss rule in as-
bestos cases. The plaintiff in an asbestos removal case must allege and
prove only the inherent dangers of exposure to asbestos to maintain a
negligence cause of action.
Between 1956 and 1958 the Kershaw County School District in-
stalled in several Kershaw County schools asbestos-containing acousti-
cal ceiling plasters that were manufactured by United States Gypsum
Company (Gypsum). As the public became more aware of the dangers
of asbestos exposure, the Kershaw County Board of Education (Ker-
shaw) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmen-
tal Control (DHEC) began an asbestos inspection program of the
county's schools. DHEC recommended that the school district remove
the ceiling plasters in three schools and temporarily enclose the ceiling
plasters in a fourth school. A private environmental consulting firm
that Kershaw employed to conduct a second inspection of the schools
also recommended that the ceiling plasters be removed. Following the
recommendations, Kershaw removed the ceiling plasters from the
schools in 1983 and 1984.27
Kershaw subsequently brought suit against Gypsum and alleged
negligence, breach of warranty, restitution, fraud, and misrepresenta-
tion. At trial the jury returned a verdict for two hundred thousand
dollars on the negligence cause of action and twenty-five thousand dol-
lars on the breach of warranty cause of action. Gypsum appealed and
argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed
24. 396 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1990).
25. Id. at 371 (citing Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 341,
384 S.E.2d 730, 734 (1989)).
26. See id.
27. Id. at 370.
1991]
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verdict on the negligence cause of action. Gypsum contended that the
economic loss rule prevented recovery of property damages caused by
asbestos under a negligence theory.
2 s
Noting its general disapproval of the economic loss rule, the su-
preme court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court relied on
Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 2 9 for the proposi-
tion "that the [economic loss] rule does not apply where other property
damage is proven." 30 In Kennedy the supreme court stated that the
economic loss rule is inapplicable to situations in which a residential
homebuilder violates a legal duty31 owed to the purchaser of a new
house.3 2 The Kennedy court found that the homebuyer's showing of a
diminution in the value of the house satisfied the requirement of other
property damage.33 The Kennedy court noted that the economic loss
rule applies only when the builder violates a purely contractual duty.3'
The decision in Kennedy evidences the supreme court's general
dislike of the economic loss rule.35 The holding in Gypsum further lim-
its the application of the rule.
The Gypsum court also heavily relied on City of Greenville v.
W.R. Grace & Co. 3 6 in reaching its decision.37 W.R. Grace & Company
28. Id. at 370-71.
29. 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989).
30. Gypsum, 396 S.E.2d at 371 (citing Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at
734).
31. The Kennedy court gave three examples of how a residential homebuilder
might violate a legal duty owed to a new homebuyer: (1) violation of an applicable build-
ing code; (2) deviation from an industry standard; and (3) construction of a home that
pose3 serious risks of physical harm. Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 346, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
32. Id. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
33. See id. at 346, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
34. An example is "where the buyer contracted for blue paint but instead received
brown." Id. at 347 n.3, 384 S.E.2d at 737 n.3.
35. See id. at 345, 384 S.E.2d at 736-37. The Kennedy court rejected the court of
appeals application of the economic loss rule in Carolina Winds Owners' Association Inc.
v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled, Ken-
nedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730 (1989). Kennedy, 299
S.C. at 345-46, 384 S.E.2d at 736-37. In Carolina Winds the court of appeals focused on
the expectations of the purchaser in determining whether the purchaser's remedy for a
defective product is in contract or tort. The court of appeals determined that if the pur-
chaser's expectations are not met because the product does not work properly, then the
purchaser's remedy lies in contract. However, if the product injures the purchaser, the
remedy is in contract or tort because the purchaser expected the product to be safe. See
Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 80-82, 374 S.E.2d at 901-02. The Kennedy court criticized
the court of appeals focus on the consequences of the builder's action and rejected the
approach in favor of one that "focuses on activity, not consequence." Kennedy, 299 S.C.
at 345, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
36. 640 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986), af'd, 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987).
37. Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369,
[Vol. 43
5
et al.: Tort Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
TORT LAW
(Grace) supplied an asbestos-containing fireproofing product that was
used in the construction of the Greenville City Hall in the early 1970s.
In 1985 the City of Greenville (Greenville) sued Grace in negligence to
recover the costs of removing and replacing the product in the city
hall. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Greenville. Grace moved
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Judge Anderson rejected
the motion and found Greenville's tort action permissible because
Grace's product "contaminated the building, damaging property and
posing a continual hazard to building occupants and workmen.
'38
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision. The Fourth Circuit stated that a plaintiff "should not be
required to wait until asbestos-related diseases manifest themselves
before maintaining an action for negligence against a manufacturer
whose product threatens a substantial and unreasonable risk of harm
by releasing toxic substances into the environment."40 The Fourth Cir-
cuit distinguished East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Dela-
val Inc.,41 in which the United States Supreme Court held that a cause
of action does not lie in tort when a defective product injures only it-
self and causes purely economic loss. The Fourth Circuit found East
River inapplicable to the case at hand because the plaintiff in East
River did not allege "any injury or threat of injury to persons or to
other property. '42 The Fourth Circuit also found that the threat of dis-
ease associated with asbestos contamination is not the type of risk par-
ties normally intend to allocate by contract. 4
3
Gypsum establishes that virtually every plaintiff in an asbestos re-
moval case may maintain a tort action for negligence. A plaintiff must
allege and prove only that the asbestos contaminated the plaintiff's
property by emitting invisible asbestos fibers. The court's decision also
further undermines the availability of the economic loss rule as a de-
fense to a tort cause of action. The court's dismissal of the economic
loss rule in both Kennedy and Gypsum clarifies that the rule is appli-
cable only in situations in which the defendant has violated a contrac-
tual duty to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court's statement that
"[w]e have not yet been presented with the question of whether the
[economic loss] rule should be so rejected in all contexts, including the
371 (S.C. 1990).
38. W.R. Grace, 640 F. Supp. at 564. Judge Anderson correctly predicted that the
South Carolina Supreme Court would permit a cause of action grounded in tort under
such circumstances. Id.
39. City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 978.
41. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
42. W.R. Grace, 827 F.2d at 977.
43. Id. at 978.
1991]
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commercial arena,"44 suggests that the rule may be limited even fur-
ther in the future.
Edward Frazier
III. TORT OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS ADOPTED
In Crandall Corp. v. Navistar International Transportation
Corp.45 the South Carolina Supreme Court formulated a common-law
cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contrac-
tual relations. In recognizing this cause of action, the majority ex-
pressly overruled Smith v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.46 and Co-
lumbia Management Corp. v. Resort Properties, Inc.47 and placed
South Carolina in accord with the vast majority of other jurisdictions.4
8
The Crandall court established that to recover on this cause of action
"the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant intentionally interfered
with the plaintiff's potential contractual relations; (2) for an improper
purpose or by improper methods; (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.'
49
In 1987 the State of South Carolina invited bidders to submit bids
for the state's purchase of one thousand new school buses for the De-
partment of Education. Navistar International Transportation Corpo-
ration (Navistar) was a prospective bidder for this contract. One of the
specifications for the new buses called for a special fuel filter, which
plaintiff Crandall Corporation (Crandall) previously supplied to the
state and to Navistar for vehicles sold by Navistar to the state.50
Crandall alleged that the parties had established a course of deal-
ing that involved Crandall supplying Navistar with a verbal quote for
use in Navistar's bid preparation. If Navistar used Crandall's bid and
was awarded the contract, then Crandall would perform the work.
44. Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369,
371 (S.C. 1990).
45. 395 S.E.2d 179 (S.C. 1990) (3-2 decision).
46. 270 S.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 548 (1978).
47. 279 S.C. 370, 307 S.E.2d 228 (1983).
48. Crandall, 395 S.E.2d at 180 (citing W. KEEToN, D. DOBBS, R. KEE'TON & D.
OWEN, PROS3ER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]; 45 AM. JuR. 2D Interference § 50 (1969)); Annotation, Liability of
Third Party for Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship between Two
Other Parties, 6 A.L.R.4TH 195 (1981).
49. Crandall, 395 S.E.2d at 180.
50. Id. (Littlejohn, Acting A. J., dissenting). Acting Associate Justice Littlejohn's
dissenting opinion sets forth the facts as alleged in Crandall's complaint. The majority
made no reference to the facts.
[Vol. 43
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Crandall supplied a quote for specified parts and labor in connection
with the school bus contract and Navistar subsequently won the con-
tract. Crandall then hired additional employees, bought equipment to
perform the project, and informed Navistar of this fact.5 1
Navistar did not contract with Crandall. Crandall brought suit al-
leging that Joe Bales, the State Department of Education's Assistant
Director of Transportation, intentionally interfered with Crandall's
prospective contract with Navistar. Crandall alleged that Bales inten-
tionally caused Navistar to breach its agreement because Crandall did
not acquiesce to Bale's alleged attempt to make pecuniary gains from
the contract. The trial judge granted Bale's motion for summary
judgment.
52
In reversing the trial judge's ruling and embracing a cause of ac-
tion for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations,
the supreme court divorced itself from the long-recognized theory es-
poused in Smith and Columbia Management. In Smith the supreme
court noted its earlier recognition of the tort of malicious interference
with contractual relationships, but refused to adopt the broader tort of
intentional interference with prospective contractual relationships.53
The Smith court reasoned that the cause of action for intentional in-
terference is based on the theory that parties to an existing contract
have a property right "which a third person has no more right mali-
ciously to deprive them of, or injure them in, than he would to injure
their property."5 If no contract exists, no property right exists, and
"[t]he law affords no protection to rights which are not in existence. '55
Other jurisdictions that have adopted the tort of intentional inter-
ference with prospective contractual relations have not uniformly
adopted the same elements. The South Carolina Supreme Court, there-
fore, had the choice of either adopting one of its sister jurisdictions'
definitions or conceiving its own distinct version. The Crandall court
chose to follow the approach adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom.55
The Isom court observed that the tort's "elements are a curious
blend of the principles of liability for intentional torts. . . and for neg-
ligent torts . . . . The disagreement and confusion incident to this
blend of intentional and negligent tort principles has produced two dif-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Smith, 270 S.C. at 449, 242 S.E.2d at 549.
54. Id. (quoting Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S.C. 262, 266, 1 S.E.2d 162, 163
(1939)).
55. Id. at 450, 242 S.E.2d at 550.
56. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
1991]
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ferent approaches to the definition of this tort.15 7 The Isom court deci-
phered the two approaches by analyzing the treatment of this cause of
action in both the first and second Restatement of Torts.
The first Restatement defines this tort as a prima facie tort and
casts upon the defendant the burden of avoiding liability by showing
that his conduct was privileged.8 The Isom court concluded that this
approach "requires too little of the plaintiff. '59 On the other hand, the
second Restatement places the burden on the plaintiff to prove his case
based on the interplay of various factors.60 The defendant's interfer-
ence must be "intentional" and "improper. '66 Noting that this ap-
proach places "a very significant burden on the plaintiff, '6 2 the Isom
court rejected the approach because of its complexity.63 The Isom
court adopted a compromise approach established by the Oregon Su-
preme Court 64 that requires "the plaintiff to allege and prove more
than the prima facie tort, but not to negate all defenses of privilege.
'65
The Crandall court followed the Isom approach and now requires
a plaintiff that alleges intentional interference with prospective con-
57. Id. at 302 (citing RESTATEmENT (SE cOND) OF TORTS Ch. 37 Introductory Note
(1977)).
58. Id. (discussing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939)); see PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 48, § 130, at 1010. Section 766 states:
Except as stated in section 698 ["Alienation and Sexual Intercourse with
Betrothed"], one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise pur-
posefully causes a third person not to
(a) perform a contract with another, or
(b) enter into or continue a business relation with another
is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
59. Isor, 657 P.2d at 303.
60. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977)). Section 766B
states:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective
contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the
other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation,
whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person nof to enter into or
continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective
relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 766B (1977). Section 767 lists the factors considered
in determining whether the interference is improper. Id. § 767.
61. Isom, 657 P.2d at 303 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 304.
64. See Straube v. Larson, 287 Or. 357, 360-61, 600 P.2d 371, 374 (1979); Top Serv.
Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 209-10, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978) (en
banc).
65. Isom, 657 P.2d at 304.
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tractual relations to prove elements similar to those set forth in Isom.66
Additionally, the supreme court gave some brief yet insightful clues on
how it will interpret these seemingly wide-open elements. For instance,
if the interfering defendant acts for more than one purpose, liability
exists only if the improper purpose predominates.6 7 Also, "[a]s an al-
ternative to establishing an improper purpose, the plaintiff may prove
the defendant's method of interference was improper under the cir-
cumstances."6 "Methods of interference considered improper are those
means that are illegal or independently tortious, such as violations of
statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules."89
Crandall strikes a logical balance between inherent transactional
fairness and the social interest in competition. Fairness demands that
one not be permitted, without suffering adverse consequences, to inter-
fere with the contractual relations of other parties. Any other legal po-
sition would effectively invalidate the utility of most contracts. The
same equitable rationale applies in certain instances in which a con-
tract has not been formally executed or performed. Overextending the
tort of intentional interference with contractual relations may result,
however, in an inefficient market. Application of this doctrine should
not extend to such lengths that it binds the competitive enterprise sys-
tem and leaves competitors to fear liability because of admittedly zeal-
ous but otherwise legal competitiveness.
On the other hand, the social interest in efficient and effective
competition arguably would be prejudiced if one were to be completely
prohibited from persuading a competitor's prospective customers not
66. Compare Crandall Corp. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 395 S.E.2d 179, 180
(S.C. 1990) (listing elements) with Isom, 657 P.2d at 304 (listing elements).
67. Crandall, 395 S.E.2d at 180.
68. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 360 S.E.2d 832
(1987)).
69. Duggin, 234 Va. at 227, 360 S.E.2d at 836 (citing Isom, 657 P.2d at 308). The
Crandall court cited Duggin as a source of extensive discussion on improper methods.
Crandall, 395 S.E.2d at 180. The Duggin court provided a laundry list of improper meth-
ods: "violence, threats or intimidation, bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresen-
tation or deceit, defamation, duress, undue influence, misuse of inside or confidential
information, or breach of fiduciary relationship." 234 Va. at 227, 360 S.E.2d at 836 (cita-
tions omitted). See also Kinco, Inc. v. Schueck Steel, Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 77, 671 S.W.2d
178, 181 (1984) (stating method may be improper if it involves sharp and overreaching
actions that result in an unfair advantage); Trepel v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 135
Mich. App. 361, 384, 354 N.W.2d 341, 351 (1984) (stating method may be improper if it
involves unethical conduct); Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201,
210, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978) (en banc) (stating method may be improper if it violates
an established standard of a trade or profession); Light v. Transport Ins. Co., 469 S.W.2d
433, 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (stating method may be improper if it falls below the
standard of "behavior of fair men similarly situated") (quoting 45 AM. JuR. 2D Interfer-
ence § 1, at 280 (1969)).
1991]
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to deal with a competitor. 70 Both social and private interests agree,
however, that only persuasion by suitable means is permissible.7 1 Pred-
atory means such as violence, fraud, and unethical conduct are neither
desirable nor necessary incidents of competition.72 By requiring proof
of "improperness", Crandall Corp. v. Navistar International Trans-
portation Corp. effectively protects the forces of competition while in-
jecting a dose of fairness into dealings in which the law of contracts
does not provide the necessary protection.
David A. Wilson
IV, SOUTH CAROLINA'S STRICT LIABILITY STATUTE APPLICABLE TO
PRODUCTS SOLD BEFORE STATUTE'S EFFECTIVE DATE IF ALSO RESOLD
AFTER THAT DATE, AND JOINT TORTFEASORS LIABLE IN STRICT TORT
NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY
In Scott ex rel. McClure v. Fruehauf Corp.73 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that South Carolina's strict liability statute74 ap-
plies to a seller that sells a product after the statute's effective date,
75
even if the product was originally placed into the stream of commerce
prior to that date.7 8 The court also held that a party that is found
liable in strict tort is not entitled to indemnity from a joint tortfeasor
that is found liable in strict tort and negligence."
James Scott sued Fruehauf Corporation (Fruehauf) and Piedmont
and Southern Leasing Company (Piedmont) for damages he sustained
while replacing a wheel assembly on the axle of a trailer. Two parts of
the wheel assembly exploded. The explosion destroyed both frontal
lobes of Scott's brain.
7 8
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (Firestone) manufactured
the wheel rim and side ring. Firestone sold the parts to a trailer manu-
facturer. The manufacturer installed the parts in a used trailer. Frue-
hauf purchased the trailer from the manufacturer and reconditioned it,
but did not break down and inspect the wheel assemblies. Fruehauf
sold the trailer to Piedmont, which leased the trailer to Scott's em-
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 comment g (1977).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 396 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 1990).
74. SC. Con ANN. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
75. The statute became effective on July 9, 1974. Scott, 396 S.E.2d at 356.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 356.
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ployer. Scott's injury occurred two years later.7 9
Scott settled with Firestone. He then sued Piedmont and Frue-
hauf. The jury found Piedmont liable in strict tort and Fruehauf liable
in strict tort and negligence. The trial judge permitted Piedmont to
crossclaim against Fruehauf for indemnification, and the jury found for
Piedmont.
The supreme court considered whether South Carolina's strict lia-
bility statutes' applies to a seller that sells a product after the effective
date of the statute if the product was placed into the stream of com-
merce prior to that date. Firestone manufactured and sold the pieces
in the defective wheel assembly prior to the effective date of the stat-
ute. Fruehauf sold the trailer containing the wheel assembly and Pied-
mont leased the trailer after that date. The court decided that "[t]he
pertinent date to determine [the statute's] application is the date the
product was sold by the seller."81 Because Fruehauf and Piedmont
both sold a defective product after the statute's effective date, the stat-
ute applied to both of them.8 2 The court's determination clarifies that
the strict liability statute may apply to products that entered the
stream of commerce prior to the effective date of the statute.
The supreme court also reversed the lower court's ruling that al-
lowed indemnification in favor of Piedmont. Because both Piedmont
and Fruehauf contributed to Scott's injury by selling a defective prod-
uct, the supreme court found that they were joint tortfeasors.8 3 The
court concluded, "Parties that have no legal relation to one another
and who owe the same duty of care to the injured party share a com-
mon liability and are joint tortfeasors without a right of indemnity be-
tween them. 8 4 This ruling reaffirms the settled principle in South Car-
79. Id.
80. Section 15-73-10 states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
81. Scott, 396 S.E.2d at 356.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 358.
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olina that no right to indemnity exists among joint tortfeasors.8 5
South Carolina recognizes an exception to the rule against indem-
nity. This exception provides that masters who are found vicariously
liable for their servants' misconduct are entitled to indemnity from
those servants.86 Some jurisdictions have extended this exception to
the analogous situation in which "the liability of one tortfeasor is strict
and the other tortfeasor was engaged in wrongful conduct. '87 In Scott
the court found the party seeking indemnity, Piedmont, liable under
strict liability and found the party from whom indemnity was sought,
Fruehauf, liable under strict liability and negligence. Thus, a question
existed as to whether an exception to the rule against indemnity
applied.
Although a party held vicariously liable for the tort of another is
entitled to indemnity, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad v. Whetstone8" rejected a distinction between ac-
tive and passive negligence when determining whether a party is enti-
tled to indemnity.8 9 "Thus, from Whetstone derives the rule that one
prerequisite for recovery of tort indemnity . . . is a showing that no
negligence of the would-be indemnitee joined with the indemnitor's to
cause the injury. '90 Because the trial court did not find Piedmont, the
"would-be indemnitee," negligent, the supreme court arguably could
have affirmed the trial court's ruling, which permitted Piedmont to re-
cover from Fruehauf, without contradicting Whetstone.9 1
The Scott court did not distinguish, however, between the parties'
different degrees of liability. The court held that because both parties
shared a common liability to Scott under the strict liability statute,
they were joint tortfeasors without a right to indemnity.
92
In holding that joint tortfeasors in strict liability are not entitled
to indemnity, the court cited Promaulayko v. Amtorg Trading Corp. 3
85. See Whetstone, 243 S.C. at 68, 132 S.E.2d at 175.
86. See Sky City Stores, Inc. v. Gregg Sec. Servs., Inc., 276 S.C. 556, 558, 280
S.E.2d 807, 808 (1981).
87. F. HUBBARD & R. FELIX, THP SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 553 (1990) (citing
Pender v. Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
88. 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963).
89. Id. at 70, 132 S.E.2d at 176.
90. McCain Mfg. Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 695 F.2d 803, 805 (4th Cir. 1982)
(citing Addy v. Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708 (1971)).
91. In Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E.2d 552
(1983), the court noted that "the modem trend concerning the right to indemnity is to
look to principles of equity." Id. at 24, 301 S.E.2d at 553. The court noted that indem-
nity would be appropriate "where one person is exposed to liability by the wrongful act
of another in which he does not join." Id.
92. Scott ex rel. McClure v. Fruehauf Corp., 396 S.E.2d 354, 358 (S.C. 1990).
93. 224 N.J. Super. 391, 540 A.2d 893 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd sub noam. Promau-
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In Promaulayko the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a seller found liable in strict tort for selling asbestos
was not entitled to indemnity from its distributor.9 ' The distributor
supplied the seller with all of its asbestos and also was found liable in
strict tort.9 5 Each party's liability was "based upon a common failure
to detect [a] defect . . . created by the manufacturer."' Both parties
therefore were without personal fault W The court noted that "[tlhe
purpose of indemnification is restitution to prevent an active wrong-
doer from being unjustly enriched by having another party discharge
the obligation of the active wrongdoer.""" The court reasoned that al-
lowing indemnity between two blameless parties "would create, rather
than prevent, unjust enrichment."99
The facts in Scott are distinguishable from those in Promaulayko
because both parties are not entirely blameless. Although Piedmont
could be considered a blameless seller, Fruehauf could not, because the
jury found it willfully negligent in failing to inspect the wheel assem-
bly. °10 Furthermore, the rule set forth in Promaulayko should have
limited persuasiveness because the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
versed it.110
The Scott decision affirms the South Carolina rule that there is no
indemnification among mere joint tortfeasors. 10 2 The court declined to
find an exception to this rule under either of two rationales. First, it
could have followed jurisdictions that allow indemnification between
tortfeasors when one party is liable under strict tort and the other
party is liable under a theory of negligence. Second, it could have
adopted an exception that allows indemnification in products liability
cases against parties that are higher in the chain of distribution. Juris-
dictions that have adopted this rule usually base their decisions on the
policy argument that allowing liability to flow up the chain of distribu-
layko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 116 N.J. 505, 562 A.2d 202 (1989). In reversing the
lower court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that even though both parties were
blameless, indemnification against the party higher in the chain of distribution was ap-
propriate. 116 N.J. at 515, 562 A.2d at 207. The court noted that the distributor was in a
better position to persuade the producer to make a safe product and to shift the cost of
the loss to the producer. Id. Therefore, as a general rule, indemnification follows the
chain of distribution in New Jersey. Id.
94. Promaulayko, 224 N.J. Super. at 398, 540 A.2d at 897.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 397, 540 A.2d at 897.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF REsTTUTiON § 1 comments a-b (1936)).
99. Id.
100. Scott ex rel. McClure v. Fruehauf Corp., 396 S.E.2d 354, 357 (S.C. 1990).
101. 116 N.J. at 516, 562 A.2d at 208.
102. Scott, 396 S.E.2d at 357-58.
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tion will lead to the production of safer products and more effectively
distribute the cost of making those products safe. 03 Although the
Scott decision is consistent with the general rule in South Carolina, it
does not address the equity and policy considerations of indemnity in a
products liability case.
Roy L. Rowe, Jr.
V. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO A PARTY'S CLAIM
THAT NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS INDUCED IT TO CONTRACT
In Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties0 4 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the parol evidence rule does not preclude a claim that
an architect's negligent misrepresentations induced a client to enter
into a contract with the architect. 0 5 This decision expands an estab-
lished rule in South Carolina that parol evidence is generally admissi-
ble to demonstrate fraud in the inducement of a contract.206
Gilliland sued Elmwood Properties (Elmwood) in contract for fail-
ure to pay for architectural services rendered pursuant to the parties'
written agreement. Elmwood's answer alleged that the nonoccurrence
of a condition precedent discharged its duty to pay Gilliland. 10 7 Elm-
wood also asserted counterclaims in contract and tort.'
103. Promaulayko, 116 N.J. at 515, 562 A.2d at 207.
104. 301 S.C. 295, 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990).
105. Id. at 302, 391 S.E.2d at 581.
106. See, e.g., Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 32, 249 S.E.2d 486, 499 (1978) (per
curiam); Allen-Parker Co. v. LoUis, 257 S.C. 266, 272, 185 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1971) (citing
Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Joyce, 231 S.C. 493, 99 S.E.2d 187 (1957)).
107. The court of appeals found that the trial court properly granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Gilliland on his breach of contract claim because the contractual provi-
sion at issue was unambiguous. Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 297 S.C. 197, 200, 375
S.E.2d 342, 344 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 301 S.C. 295, 391 S.E.2d
577 (1990). The supreme court found the provision ambiguous and reversed. Gilliland,
301 S.C. at 300, 391 S.E.2d at 579-80.
108. Gilliland, 301 S.C. at 297-98, 391 S.E.2d at 578-79. The breach of contract
counterclaim included allegations that Gilliland failed (1) to design a project that would
qualify for tax-exempt bond funding, (2) to observe budgetary limits, (3) to design a
project that could be conventionally financed, and (4) to obtain governmental agency
approvals'for construction of the project. Id. at 298, 391 S.E.2d at 578-79. The supreme
court affirmed the court of appeals disposition of this counterclaim. The supreme court
stated:
None of the alleged breaches of contract can be evidenced by express contrac-
tual provisions. The parol evidence rule prevents the introduction of extrinsic
evidence of agreements or understandings contemporaneous with or prior to
execution of a written instrument when the extrinsic evidence is to be used to
contradict, vary, or explain the written instrument.
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Elmwood's tort counterclaim included two components. First,
Elmwood asserted that Gilliland committed professional malpractice
by negligently performing his architectural services. The allegations
underlying this claim were similar to those that formed the basis of the
counterclaim for breach of contract. 09 Second, Elmwood alleged that
Gilliland made negligent misrepresentations that induced Elnwood to
enter the contract. Specifically, Elmwood alleged that during negotia-
tions Gilliland indicated that he already had met the necessary stan-
dards for acquiring tax-exempt bond funding for the project. 110 Elm-
wood claimed that it relied on Gilliland's statement that all
governmental approvals were "under control."' However, at the time
the contract was executed, Gilliland had not secured tax-exempt bond
funding nor received the desired governmental approvals.1 ' 2 The court
of appeals disposed of the allegations underlying Elmwood's profes-
sional malpractice claim on the basis that Elmwood failed to show a
relationship with Gilliland independent of the contract that would give
rise to a tort duty." 3 The court of appeals also rejected Elmwood's neg-
ligent misrepresentation claim. The court of appeals found that the pa-
rol evidence rule barred the introduction of the extrinsic evidence nec-
essary to establish this claim." 4 The court of appeals made no
distinction between parol evidence offered to show negligent misrepre-
sentation and that offered to demonstrate breach of contract." 5
The supreme court affirmed the preclusion of Elmwood's architect
malpractice claim, but for a different reason. The court decided that
Elmwood had pleaded facts sufficient to demonstrate a relationship
which created a tort duty independent of the contract." 6 The court did
not allow the claim because Elmwood had not presented the expert
testimony required to "establish both the standard of care and the
deviation by [Gilliland] from such standard.
' "1
Id. at 302, 391 S.E.2d at 581 (citing Iseman v. Hobbs, 290 S.C. 482, 351 S.E.2d 351 (Ct.
App. 1986)).
109. Id. at 298, 391 S.E.2d at 580. The supreme court treated these allegations as
allegations of architect malpractice. Id. at 300, 391 S.E.2d at 580. The court of appeals
did not recognize this classification. See Gilliland, 297 S.C. at 202, 375 S.E.2d at 345
(stating that "there exists no duty or relationship independent of the contract").
110. Brief of Petitioner at 26.
111. Id. at 26-27.
112. See id.
113. Gilliland, 297 S.C. at 202, 375 S.E.2d at 345.
114. See id, at 201-02, 375 S.E.2d at 345.
115. See id.
116. Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295, 300, 391 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1990).
117. Id. at 301, 391 S.E.2d at 580 (citing W. KEEroN, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OP TORTS § 32, at 188 n.49 (5th ed. 1984)); see
also Kemmerlin v. Wingate, 274 S.C. 62, 65, 261 S.E.2d 50, 51 (1979) (applying this rule
1991]
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The supreme court reversed the court of appeals finding that the
parol evidence rule barred Elmwood's negligent misrepresentation
claim.118 The court noted that in South Carolina a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care in providing information exists whenever the party mak-
ing the representation has a pecuniary interest in the transaction. 1 9
Furthermore, the court noted that South Carolina recognizes a cause of
action in tort for negligent misrepresentation "where the misrepre-
sented fact(s) induced the plaintiff to enter a contract or business
transaction. 120 The court acknowledged that "[t]he applicability of
the parol evidence rule to a cause of action for negligent misrepresen-
tation is apparently a novel issue in this state."'' The court embraced
the reasoning of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Formento v. Encanto
Business Park,122 which held that the parol evidence rule is inapplica-
ble to tort actions because the rule is one of substantive contract
law." The Gilliland court recognized the Formento approach as indic-
ative of the majority rule 24 and expressly adopted it.12 5
The Formento court articulated an additional ground supporting
its holding: "'Where a misrepresentation is fraudulent or where a neg-
ligent misrepresentation is one of material fact, the policy of finality
rightly gives way to the policy of promoting honest dealings between
the parties.' ,,12" The Gilliland court did not expressly refer to this pol-
icy analysis in reaching its decision, but did quote Formento for the
proposition that "'a seller should not be allowed to hide behind an
integration clause to avoid the consequences of a misrepresentation,
whether fraudulent or negligent.' ,'27
to a case involving allegations of professional malpractice by accountants).
118. Gilliland, 301 S.C. at 301-02, 391 S.E.2d at 580-81.
119. Id. at 301, 391 S.E.2d at 580 (citing Winburn v. Insurance Co. of N. America,
287 S.C. 435, 441, 339 S.E.2d 142, 146 (Ct. App. 1985)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 552 (1977).
120. Gilliland, 301 S.C. at 301, 391 S.E.2d at 580.
121. Id. at 302, 391 S.E.2d at 580.
122. 154 Ariz. 495, 744 P.2d 22 (Ct. App.), review denied, 154 Ariz. 495, 495, 744
P.2d 22, 22 (1987).
123. Id. at 499, 744 P.2d at 26 (citing Rental Dev. Corp. of America v. Rubenstein
Constr. Co., 96 Ariz. 133, 393 P.2d 144 (1964); Fiorentino v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 F.
Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
124. See Gilliland, 301.S.C. at 302, 391 S.E.2d at 580-81 (citing Rempel v. Nation-
wide Life Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 412, 370 A.2d 366, 370 (1977)).
125. Id., 391 S.E.2d at 581.
126. Formento, 154 Ariz. at 499, 744 P.2d at 26 (quoting Hill v. Jones, 151 Ariz. 81,
84, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Ct. App. 1986)); see RESTATE&ENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §
164(1) (1981).
127. Gilliland, 301 S.C. at 302, 391 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting Formento, 154 Ariz. at
499, 744 P.2d at 26). The contract between Elmwood and Gilliland contained an integra-
tion clause. Id. at 301, 391 S.E.2d at 580.
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The supreme court's decision in Gilliland adopts the majority ap-
proach concerning the relationship between the parol evidence rule
and claims which allege that negligent misrepresentations induced a
party to enter into a contract. This decision is limited, however, to sit-
uations that involve the parol evidence rule in the context of negligent
misrepresentations that induced a party to enter into a contract.
Dodd M. Davis
VI. LIABILITY LIMITS OF TORT CLAIMS ACT UPHELD
In Wright v. Colleton County School District128 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court rejected four constitutional challenges to the limits
established by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the Act) 129 on
damages recoverable'"0 in suits against the state for tortious conduct.' 3'
In a unanimous opinion the court held that the Act does not violate
the separation of powers doctrine"32 or a plaintiff's constitutional right
to a jury trial,"'3 a remedy for wrongs sustained,"" or equal protection
of the laws. 1 5
On July 3, 1986, a child suffered serious injuries while working on
the premises of the Colleton County School District. The child's
mother, proceeding on her own behalf as well as on behalf of her child,
reached a conditional settlement with the school district in the amount
of $1,000,000, which represented the limits of the school district's in-
128. 301 S.C. 282, 391 S.E.2d 564 (1990).
129. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
130. Section 15-78-120(a) states:
For any action or claim for damages brought under the provisions of this chap-
ter, the liability shall not exceed the following limits:
(1) Except as provided in Section 15-78-120(a)(3), no person shall re-
cover in any action or claim brought hereunder a sum exceeding two
hundred fifty thousand dollars because of loss arising from a single oc-
currence regardless of the number of agencies or political subdivisions
involved.
(2) Except as provided in Section 15-78-120(a)(4), the total sum recov-
ered hereunder arising out of a single occurrence shall not exceed five
hundred thousand dollars regardless of the number of agencies or politi-
cal subdivisions or claims or actions involved.
Id. § 15-78-120(a).
131. Wright, 301 S.C. at 290-92, 391 S.E.2d at 569-70.
132. Id. at 292, 391 S.E.2d at 370; see S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
133. Wright, 301 S.C. at 290-91, 391 S.E.2d at 569; see U.S. CONST. amend. VII; S.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 14.
•134. Wright, 301 S.C. at 291, 391 S.E.2d at 570; see S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9.
135. Wright, 301 S.C. at 291-92, 391 S.E.2d at 570; see U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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surance coverage. The settlement provided for immediate payment of
$250,000 and an additional payment of $750,000 if a court held the
limitation of damages provisions of the Act invalid, unconstitutional,
or waived. If the plaintiffs did not receive the $750,000, they would
receive an additional $250,000 if a court decided that the mother pos-
sessed an independent right of recovery under the Act. The plaintiffs
instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine their rights
under the settlement agreement. The circuit court awarded the plain-
tiffs the $750,000. The school district appealed. 136
The plaintiffs raised four constitutional challenges to the $250,000
per person and the $500,000 per occurrence liability caps established
by the Act. First, they argued that the limitations on damages infringe
upon the constitutional right to a jury trial. In rejecting the plaintiffs'
challenge, the court adopted the reasoning of Boyd v. Bulala"'3 and
Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 38 two related cases that up-
held Virginia's statutory cap on medical malpractice damages against
challenges similar to those raised in Wright. Both Boyd and Etheridge
held that although an essential function of the jury is to ascertain dam-
ages, a plaintiff's right to a particular remedy is a matter of law that is
beyond the jury's fact-finding role. 39 Second, the plaintiffs argued that
the limitations violate the right-to-remedy provision of the state con-
stitution."1 0 The court rejected this claim and held that the provision is
not a guarantee of full compensation to injured persons.2
4 1
Third, the plaintiffs argued that the limitations violate the equal
protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Because
the court found that the limitations did not infringe upon a fundamen-
tal right, the court applied the three-prong rational relationship test
recently employed in Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services.1
42
Under Doe a statute satisfies equal protection analysis "if (1) the clas-
sification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought
to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under
similar circumstances and conditions; and (3) the classification rests on
some reasonable basis. '" 3 The Wright court concluded that the Act's
136. Wright, 301 S.C. at 284-85, 391 S.E.2d at 566.
137. 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
138. 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
139. Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196; Etheridge, 237 Va. at 96, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
140. Article I, section 9 states, "All courts shall be public, and every person shall
have speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9.
141. Wright v. Colleton County School Dist., 301 S.C. 282, 291, 391 S.E.2d 564, 570
(1990).
142. 297 S.C. 430, 437, 377 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1989) (per curiam).
143. Wright, 301 S.C. at 291, 391 S.E.2d at 570.
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liability limits pass the Doe test. 4 4
Fourth, the plaintiffs argued that the limitations violate the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. The court noted that it is within the legisla-
ture's power to alter any remedy.145 The court held, therefore, that the
Act's limitations on the amount of damages recoverable do not invade
the province of the judiciary.
1 46
Considered in light of other authority and the recent disintegra-
tion of the sovereign immunity doctrine in South Carolina,1 47 the deci-
sion in Wright is both proper and predictable. The Wright decision is
in accord with a majority of decisions from other jurisdictions on all
four questions considered.
A majority of other jurisdictions that have limitations on the
amount and kind of damages recoverable against the state have upheld
these statutes against right-to-jury challenges.148 Most courts are also
in accord with the Wright court's conclusion that the right-to-redress
clause does not guarantee full compensation to injured tort victims
149
and that the separation of powers doctrine does not prohibit monetary
caps on recovery." Similarly, the Wright court's conclusion that the
Act's limitations on damages do not violate the equal protection clause
is in harmony with a majority of cases from other jurisdictions that
have upheld similar statutes against equal protection and due process
attacks. These decisions typically utilize a rational basis test.' 5'
144. Id.
145. Id. at 292, 391 S.E.2d at 570 (citing S.C. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1; State v. Carson,
274 S.C. 316, 262 S.E.2d 918 (1980)).
146. Id.
147. The South Carolina Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity as a defense
to allegations of tortious conduct in McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741
(1985). The General Assembly soon thereafter promulgated the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act, S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (effective July
1, 1986).
148. See, e.g., Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 789 P.2d 541
(1990) (discussing cases).
149. See, e.g., Jetton v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 399 So. 2d 396, 398-99 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied, 411 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1981); Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App.
133, 146-49, 573 A.2d 853, 859-61, cert. granted, 321 Md. 46, 580 A.2d 1066 (1990).
150. See, e.g., Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 100-01, 376 S.E.2d
525, 532 (1989) (holding separation of powers clause in state constitution not violated).
In Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989), the court rejected a separation of pow-
ers challenge based on federal constitutional law "for the simple reason that those princi-
ples are inapplicable." Id. at 1196. Relying on Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689
n.4 (1980), the court ruled that the federal separation of powers doctrine does not bind
the states. Boyd, 877 F.2d at 1196.
151. See, e.g., Home Indem. Co. v. Anders, 459 So. 2d 836, 840-41 (Ala. 1984) (citing
Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. 1981)); Lee v. Colorado
Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 227-28 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); Cauley v. City of Jackson-
ville, 403 So. 2d 379, 387 (Fla. 1981); Jetton, 399 So. 2d at 399; Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104
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The case of Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services 52 virtually
compelled the result in Wright. In Doe the South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the statutory limit on the liability of charitable organiza-
tions153 against an equal protection attack.15' It is difficult to see how
the court could reject a monetary cap on recovery against the state and
maintain such a cap in actions against charitable organizations.
Further, South Carolina has long distinguished between govern-
mental and nongovernmental tortfeasors. Prior to the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in McCall v. Batson,"55 which abrogated sov-
ereign immunity in South Carolina, the plaintiffs could not have recov-
ered against the state. It hardly seems unjust, therefore, to limit the
plaintiffs' recovery to a specified statutory cap.
Wright does not represent a departure from either South Carolina
decisions or cases from other jurisdictions that deal with statutory caps
on damages in actions against a state. Rather, Wright signals the
South Carolina Supreme Court's continued deference to legislative so-
lutions. The equal protection and right-to-jury analyses in Wright lib-
erally favor legislative policy-making. The court also narrowly inter-
preted the right-to-redress clause and separation of powers doctrines,
which could pose significant challenges to many legislative schemes.
Timothy A. Domin
Idaho 357, 374, 659 P.2d 111, 128 (1983); Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64 IlM. 2d 109,
355 N.E.2d 537 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of
Claims, 109 IMI. 2d 72, 79, 485 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1985); Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861,
866-68 (Minn. 1988); Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 665-69, 406
A.2d 704, 706-08 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Riviera v. Gerner, 89
N.J. 526, 534-35, 446 A.2d 508, 512 (1982); Wilson v. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349, 1351-53
(Olda. 1988); Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 526, 783 P.2d 506, 516 (1989); Crowe
v. John W. Harton Memorial Hosp., 579 S.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1979); Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 370-78,
293 N.W.2d 504, 509-14, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). But see Ryszkiewicz v. City
of New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 596-601, 479 A.2d 793, 798-801 (1984) (holding that 81000
liability limit to specifically named city did not pass rational basis test). Interestingly,
the Wright court failed to cite any of these relevant authorities to support its conclusion
that the Act's limitations on liability do not violate equal protection guarantees.
152. 297 S.C. 430, 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989) (per curiam).
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
154. Doe, 297 S.C. at 436-39, 377 S.E.2d at 326-28.
155. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
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VII. DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM CODEFENDANT
IF CODEFENDANT FOUND LIABLE AND DEFENDANT EXONERATED
In Town of Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc.156 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals held that a general contractor is entitled to
indemnification from a subcontractor for attorney fees incurred in the
defense of a claim of joint negligence when the jury finds the subcon-
tractor liable for negligence and completely exonerates the general con-
tractor.157 The court expressly overruled JKT Co. v. Hardwick'5  in
reaching its decision.159
The Turner-Murphy Company (Turner-Murphy) served as general
contractor for the construction of a waste water treatment facility for
the Town of Winnsboro (the Town). Turner-Murphy hired Specialty
Constructors, Inc. (Specialty) as a subcontractor to install an auto-
matic filter system. After numerous problems with the filter system's
operation, the Town sued Turner-Murphy for breach of contract, negli-
gence, and fraud in the construction of the facility.1 0 The Town
amended its complaint to include Specialty as a defendant.' 6 ' Turner-
Murphy then crossclaimed against Specialty and sought indemnifica-
tion for attorney fees and damages sustained in the suit.
6 2
At trial the jury found Specialty liable for negligence, but com-
pletely exonerated Turner-Murphy. The trial court then granted Tur-
ner-Murphy's motion for a directed verdict on its crossclaim for attor-
ney fees. Specialty appealed.6 3
Specialty argued on appeal that the rule barring indemnification
among joint tortfeasors' 6' prohibited the trial judge from granting Tur-
ner-Murphy's motion. Specialty contended that the court of appeals
decision in JKT bars a defendant that "successfully defends against its
own misconduct [from seeking] indemnification in attorney's fees and
expenses from a co-defendant who did not prevail."'16 5 Specialty argued
156. 398 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
157. Id. at 504.
158. 284 S.C. 10, 325 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam), overruled, Town of
Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990). In a case
decided concurrently with Wiedeman-Singleton, the court of appeals discussed the effect
of the decision on cases in which a lawsuit is settled and not litigated to a verdict. See
Griffin v. Van Norman, 397 S.E.2d 378 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
159. Wiedeman-Singleton, 398 S.E.2d at 505.
160. Id. at 501.
161. Brief of Appellant at 3.
162. Wiedeman-Singleton, 39&S.E.2d at 501.
163. Id.
164. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 68, 132 S.E.2d 172, 175
(1963).
165. Brief of Appellant at 3.
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that sufficient evidence existed to establish that Turner-Murphy was
defending against its own alleged misconduct.16 Specialty further ar-
gued that because no special relationship existed between Turner-Mur-
phy and Specialty, Turner-Murphy could not recover attorney fees on
a theory of implied indemnity.
1 6 7
Turner-Murphy responded by arguing that Specialty's focus on
the technical wording of the complaint was improper. Turner-Murphy
argued that the determination of whether a party was defending
against its own alleged misconduct requires a review of the substance
of the complaint and the record.168 Turner-Murphy also disputed Spe-
cialty's position that a special relationship is required to recover on a
theory of implied indemnity. It argued that JKT "broadened the anal-
ysis of the relationship giving rise to liability to include not only con-
structive and vicarious liability, but also derivative or technical
liability.'
1 69
Turner-Murphy based its right to recover attorney fees on alter-
nate theories. First, Turner-Murphy asserted that the court should
view the fees as special damages flowing from Specialty's breach of
contract. Second, Turner-Murphy argued that the principle of equita-
ble indemnity entitled it to attorney fees.170
In analyzing Turner-Murphy's claim for indemnification, the court
of appeals noted that South Carolina permits actions for equitable in-
demnity by a party that has had the negligence of another party im-
puted to it as long as the party that seeks indemnification has not
joined in causing the injury.17 1 The court clarified the concept of equi-
table indemnity by providing an example in the context of the master-
servant relationship. The court explained that when a master is vicari-
166. Id. In particular, Specialty pointed to the Town's omission of Specialty as a
defendant in the original complaint. Specialty argued that this omission and the Town's
allegations of joint and several liability indicated that Turner-Murphy was in court to
defend its own alleged acts of negligence. Id.
167. Id. at 6-7.
168. Brief of Respondent at 12-13.
169. Id. at 17 (citing JKT Co. v. Hardwick, 284 S.C. 10, 325 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App.
1984) (per curiam), overruled, Town of Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 398
S.E.2d 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990)).
170. Wiedeman-Singleton, 398 S.E.2d at 502.
171. Id. at 503 (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 70, 132
S.E.2d 172, 176 (1963)). This rule is well settled in most jurisdictions. See 42 C.J.S. In-
demnity §§ 32, 36 (1991).
The Wiedeman-Singleton court noted that the South Carolina General Assembly
abolished the rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors in the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act. 398 S.E.2d at 502 n.1 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-10 to -
70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)). This act does not affect, however, rights to indemnity. F.
HUBBARD & R. FELix, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 552 (1990) (citing S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-38-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
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ously liable for a tortious act of a servant, "the law requires the servant
(first party) to indemnify his master (second party) for the damages
the master incurs to the third party because of the servant's tort.'
172
The court of appeals then found that under Addy v. Bolton'73 Turner-
Murphy could recover attorney fees based on a theory of equitable in-
demnity or as an element of special damages.
17 4
In Addy the Boltons were owners of a building leased by Addy.
The Boltons hired the C.Y. Thomason Company (Thomason) to repair
the building. Addy sued the Boltons and Thomason for joint negli-
gence after Thomason started a fire that damaged Addy's merchandise.
The jury returned a verdict against Thomason, but not against the
Boltons. The trial judge refused to allow Bolton to recover attorney
fees on its crossclaim against Thomason for indemnity.17 5 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed. 1 6 It reasoned that the Boltons could
recover either on the theory that an implied contract of indemnity ex-
isted between the Boltons and Thomason or because the Boltons "were
put to the necessity of defending themselves against the lessees' claim
by the tortious conduct of the contractor.' 17 7 The court of appeals con-
cluded that Addy presented "precisely the same fact pattern as the
case at bar' 78 and held that Specialty had to indemnify Turner-Mur-
phy for the attorney fees Turner-Murphy expended in successfully de-
fending against the Town's suit.
7 9
The court of appeals next considered the tension between Addy
and JKT Co. v. Hardwick'8 and resolved the issue by expressly over-
ruling the latter.'8 ' In JKT the plaintiff sued the Celotex Corporation
(Celotex) and Hardwick. The plaintiff alleged that Celotex had sup-
plied the defective roofing materials and that Hardwick had negli-
gently installed the roof. Hardwick crossclaimed against Celotex for in-
demnification. The jury returned a verdict against Celotex, but not
against Hardwick. The trial court awarded Hardwick's motion for costs
and attorney fees."a2
The court of appeals applied the rule that prohibits indemnifica-
172. Wiedeman-Singleton, 398 S.E.2d at 503 (citing Bell v. Clinton Oil Mill, 129
S.C. 242, 256-57, 124 S.E. 7, 12 (1924)).
173. 257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708 (1971).
174. Wiedeman-Singleton, 398 S.E.2d at 504.
175. Addy, 257 S.C. at 31-32, 183 S.E.2d at 708-09.
176. Id. at 34, 183 S.E.2d at 710.
177. Id. at 32-33, 183 S.E.2d at 709.
178. Wiedeman-Singleton, 398 S.E.2d at 503.
179. Id. at 504.
180. 284 S.C. 10, 325 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. f984) (per curiam), overruled, Town of
Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
181. Wiedeman-Singleton, 398 S.E.2d at 505.
182. JKT, 284 S.C. at 11-12, 325 S.E.2d at 330-31.
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tion among joint tortfeasors and reversed. The court held that a would-
be indemnitee that successfully defends against allegations of miscon-
duct has a right to indemnification for legal expenses only if it would
have been entitled to indemnification had it lost.183 The court of ap-
peals found that allowing Hardwick to recover legal expenses would
require too broad an interpretation of Addy: "Were we to hold other-
wise, then every defendant found not negligent could recover attor-
neys' fees against another defendant who was found negligent. The
Addy decision does not support such an unprecedented rule. 18 4
The majority in Wiedeman-Singleton reasoned that the JKT
court's application of the rule against indemnity among joint
tortfeasors was erroneous because Hardwick prevailed at trial and thus
was not a joint tortfeasor. 85 Furthermore, the majority found that
Addy, JKT, and Wiedeman-Singleton contained identical fact pat-
terns: the complaints alleged that both defendants committed indepen-
dent acts of wrongdoing, and the juries exonerated the defendants who
sought indemnity and found the other defendants negligent. 8 6 The
Wiedeman-Singleton majority abandoned the rule set forth in JKT as
unjust and inconsistent with the supreme court's decision in Addy.187
On the other hand, Judge Goolsby contended that although the
result in Wiedeman-Singleton is correct, the majority's decision to
overrule JKT would produce an unfortunate effect.
[W]hat the majority does by overruling JKT is to expand the Su-
preme Court's holding in Addy and to sanction in all cases involving
codefendants, irrespective of the relationship existing between them,
the recovery of attorney fees and litigation costs on the basis of equi-
table indemnity by a defendant who successfully defended against his
own acts from a codefendant who was found liable.188
Judge Goolsby contended that the majority's decision to overrule JKT
was unnecessary because JKT and Addy were factually
distinguishable. 189
Although the result in Wiedeman-Singleton was correct, the court
of appeals decision to overrule JKT may have the inequitable effect of
allowing a defendant that prevails at trial to recover attorney fees from
an unsuccessful codefendant whenever the complaint alleges joint neg-
183. See id. at 13, 16, 325 S.E.2d at 331, 333.
184. Id. at 16, 325 S.E.2d at 333.
185. Wiedeman-Singleton, 398 S.E.2d at 505.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 506 (Goolsby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. (citing Gray & Catt, The Law of Indemnity in South Carolina, 41 S.C.L.
REV. 603, 607-09 (1990)).
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ligence. The complaint in Addy charged the Boltons and Thomason
with "joint and concurrent negligent, careless and reckless acts."'190 As
the JKT court noted, however, "this allegation was not conclusive
upon whether the lessors were in actuality defending against their own
alleged wrongful acts." 191 The complaint in JKT asserted that Hard-
wick, the would-be indemnitee, engaged in active negligence separately
and independently from the conduct of his codefendant. 9 2 The court
of appeals properly rejected, therefore, Hardwick's petition for indem-
nification. Courts should focus on the substance of the complaint and
on the record when determining whether a defendant is entitled to in-
demnification from a codefendant for attorney fees incurred in the suc-
cessful defense of a suit that alleges joint negligence. 93 The court of
appeals approach in JKT was sound, and Judge Goolsby properly ar-
gued that it should not have been overruled.
Dodd M. Davis
VIII. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS
REQUIRES ACTUAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
In Niver v. South Carolina Department of Highways & Public
Transportation9" the South Carolina Court of Appeals considered the
scope of governmental immunity under the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act' 95 for discretionary actions. In a unanimous opinion the
court held that a governmental entity is entitled to immunity for dis-
cretionary actions only if it actually makes a conscious choice after
weighing competing considerations. 196
On November 4, 1986, the motorcycle Timothy P. Niver was driv-
ing collided with a pickup truck. Just prior to the accident, Niver had
been following the truck on Highway 244 in Lexington County. As the
two vehicles approached the intersection of Belton Road and Highway
244, Niver pulled into the left lane and attempted to pass the truck. As
Niver passed the truck, the driver began to turn left onto Belton Road
190. Addy v. Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 31, 183 S.E.2d 708, 708 (1971).
191. JKT Co. v. Hardwick, 284 S.C. 10, 14, 325 S.E.2d 329, 332 (Ct. App. 1984) (per
curiam), overruled, Town of Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 500
(S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
192. Id. at 12, 325 S.E.2d at 330.
193. See Gray & Catt, supra note 189, at 609 (discussing common law availability of
indemnity for passive misconduct).
194. 395 S.E.2d 728 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
195. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
196. Niver, 395 S.E.2d at 730.
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and the collision occurred. 19 7
Under South Carolina law a no-passing zone exists for one hun-
dred feet before any intersection.1 98 Niver's allegations of negligence
against the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Trans-
portation (the Department) focused on the Department's failure to
place either yellow lines or road signs on Highway 244 to indicate the
no-passing zone. The circuit court granted the Department's motion
for summary judgment based on the Department's defense of govern-
mental immunity for discretionary actions. Niver appealed. 98
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act provides "the exclusive civil
remedy available for any tort committed by a governmental entity, its
employees, or its agents except as provided in § 15-78-70(b). '20 The
Act states that a governmental entity such as the Department is liable
for its torts "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations upon li-
ability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, con-
tained herein."2 '' One exemption is that a "governmental entity is not
liable for a loss resulting from ... the exercise of discretion or judg-
ment by the governmental entity or employee or the performance or
failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or judg-
ment of the governmental entity or employee." 02 Another, more spe-
cific, exemption is that no "liability aris[es] from a failure of any gov-
ernmental entity to initially place any ... signs, signals, [or] warning
devices . . . when the failure is the result of a discretionary act of the
governmental entity."
203
The issue in Niver was whether the Department's "failure to place
either striping or signs on Highway 244 to indicate a no-passing zone
for southbound travelers on the highway within 100 feet of the inter-
section of Belton Road and Highway 244 resulted in fact from a discre-
197. Id. at 729.
198. See S.C. CODE ANN,. § 56-5-1880(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1991) ("No vehicle shall be
driven on the left side of the roadway ... [wlhen approaching within one hundred feet
of or traversing any intersection ... .
199. Niver, 395 S.E.2d at 729.
200. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Section 15-78-70(b)
states:
Nothing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmen-
tal entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's
conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted
actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral
turpitude.
rd. § 15-78-70(b).
201. Id. § 15-78-40.
202. Id. § 15-78-60(5).
203. Id. § 15-78-60(15).
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tionary decision."'204 The court concluded that to qualify for immunity
for discretionary actions, the governmental entity must actually weigh
competing considerations and then make a conscious decision among
alternatives.20 5 Mere oversight is an insufficient basis for the govern-
ment to claim the immunity.
20 6
The court of appeals noted, "As the record now stands, there is
nothing whatever to indicate that competing choices were actually con-
sidered by the Department ... -o. In other words, no evidence ex-
isted that the Department's decision not to place stripes or signs along
the segment of Highway 244 where the collision occurred involved the
exercise of discretion. Because governmental immunity is an affirma-
tive defense that the governmental entity bears the burden of estab-
lishing,20 the circuit court's award of summary judgment in favor of
the Department was improper.209 The court of appeals reversed the cir-
cuit court and remanded the case for further inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding the Department's failure to place either stripes or
signs on Highway 244.210
The Niver court's definition of discretionary immunity aligns
South Carolina with the minority of states.211 Most states examine the
governmental entity's act simply to determine if the act is discretion-
204. Niver v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 395 S.E.2d 728,
730 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
205. Id. (citing Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Burgdorf
v. Funder, 246 Cal. App. 2d 443, 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966); Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C.
562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973) (per curiam); 57 AM. JuR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and
State Tort Liability § 119 (1988)).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing 57 AM. Jun. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability
§ 676 (1988)).
209. See id. at 731. The Department contended that two statutory provisions, con-
sidered in light of the provisions concerning governmental immunity for discretionary
acts, immunized it as a matter of law. Id. at 730. The Department cited section 56-5-930,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-930 (Law. Co-op. 1991), and section 56-5-1890, id. § 56-5-1890.
Section 56-5-930 authorizes the Department to place traffic-control devices
upon all state highways "as it shall deem necessary ... to warn or guide traf-
fic" and Section 56-5-1890 ... authorizes the Department to determine and
designate by signs or markings those portions of any highway where "passing
or driving to the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous."
Niver, 395 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-930, -1890(a) (Law. Co-op.
1991)). The court noted that those sections proved only that the Department had the
opportunity to exercise discretion in this situation; they provided no evidence that the
Department actually exercised its discretion and made a decision under those sections.
Id.
210. Niver, 395 S.E.2d at 731.
211. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KE=TON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1047 (5th ed. 1984).
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ary in nature; they do not attempt to determine whether the govern-
mental entity actually exercised discretion.2 12 Only a few states require
a governmental entity claiming this defense to show that it actually
engaged in conscious decision making.2 13 By defining discretionary im-
munity as it did, the court of appeals reduced the number of future
cases in which the government will prevail under this defense.
Clarence W. McGee
IX. ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE FOR PARTICIPANTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
EXPANDED
In Crowell v. Herring2 4 the South Carolina Court of Appeals ex-
tended an absolute privilege to preliminary communications made
prior to the commencement of a formal investigation or judicial pro-
ceeding. The court held that the absolute privilege which protects
statements of judges, parties, and witnesses made during a judicial pro-
ceeding also protects any statement that arises out of the proceeding if
it has a reasonable relation to the proceeding. 215 This decision signifi-
cantly expands the scope of the absolute privilege and is consistent
with decisions in other jurisdictions.
The plaintiff, William H. Crowell, was the commander of a local
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) post that housed several video ma-
chines owned and operated by defendant Hoyt's Music Company. In
September 1985, at Crowell's suggestion, Crowell and Michael Herring,
president of Hoyt's Music Company, devised a new arrangement for
the division of the profits from the machines."" Under the new ar-
rangement the VFW received additional profits. Herring later became
concerned with the situation because he suspected Crowell of misap-
propriating the additional profits. Herring executed an affidavit
describing the arrangement.2 1 7 The affidavit led to the investigation of
212. See id. ("There are a great many... cases... in which the state clearly ap-
pears to be negligent or in which the trier of fact might so find, and in which the state is
nonetheless shielded from all responsibility on the ground that there is general discretion
or some particular statutory version of it.").
213. See id.
214. 301 S.C. 424, 392 S.E.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
215. Id. at 430, 392 S.E.2d at 467.
216. Formerly, the VFW post and Hoyt's Music Company divided the profits
equally. Under the new arrangement, the VFW post received all of the profits from the
two lowest grossing machines as well as half the profits from the other machines. Herring
would place the money in an envelope with Crowell's name on it and leave the envelope
with the canteen manager. Id. at 427, 392 S.E.2d at 465.
217. Six months after preparing the first affidavit, "Herring executed [the second]
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Crowell and to the institution of court-martial proceedings. Crowell
was acquitted of all charges at the court-martial hearing. Crowell then
brought suit against Herring.218 Crowell alleged that the statements
made by Herring in his affidavit were defamatory.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the libel and slander causes of action. The trial court found
that any statements alleged to be defamatory were made in connection
with the court-martial hearing, which the court held to be a judicial
proceeding.219 The statements therefore were absolutely privileged.
220
Generally, courts extend an absolute privilege to any communica-
tion made prior to a judicial proceeding so long as the statement has
some relation to the proceeding. 22 South Carolina courts have recog-
nized this principle, but have applied it only to preliminary statements
made after the commencement of a judicial proceeding.222 South Caro-
lina courts had not developed law regarding preliminary communica-
tions such as depositions or informal affidavits that were made prior to
the institution of formal proceedings or to someone other than an of-
ficer of the court.
223
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied heavily on a
New Jersey case, Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc.224 In
Rainier's Dairies Raritan Valley Farms filed petitions with the Direc-
tor of Milk Industry accusing Rainier's Dairies of price fixing. Follow-
ing a "quasi-judicial" hearing before the Director in which Raritan
failed to meet its burden of proof, Rainier's Dairies brought suit
against Raritan. Rainier's Dairies alleged that the petitions sent by
Raritan to the Director were libelous. The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Raritan. The court held that Raritan could assert the absolute immu-
nity afforded participants in judicial proceedings even though the peti-
tions predated the initiation of formal proceedings against Rainier's
affidavit correcting what he deemed improper use of terminology in the first affidavit."
Id. at 428, 392 S.E.2d at 466. Crowell alleged that both affidavits contained libelous
statements. The court of appeals rejected the charges for each affidavit, but for different
reasons. Id. at 432, 392 S.E.2d at 468. Only the court's treatment of the first affidavit has
been considered.
218. Crowell also sued Herring's father, Hoyt Herring, who was the chairman of
Hoyt's Music Company, and the VFW trustees who were involved in the preliminary
investigation of Crowell. Id. at 429, 392 S.E.2d at 466.
219. Id. at 430, 392 S.E.2d at 467.
220. Id. at 429-30, 392 S.E.2d at 467.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 587 (1977), cited in Crowell, 301 S.C. at
430, 392 S.E.2d at 467.
222. Crowell, 301 S.C. at 430, 392 S.E.2d at 467.
223. Id., 392 S.E.2d at 467.
224. 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1955).
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Dairies .225
The Rainier's Dairies court based its decision in part on notions of
public policy. 220 Although the court recognized that an individual's
reputation should be free from defamatory attack, it reasoned that
"there is a paramount public interest that persons be permitted to
speak or write freely without being restrained by the possibility of an
ensuing defamation action."
'227
Rainier's Dairies and Crowel both involved unsolicited state-
ments228 made prior to the commencement of formal proceedings. 229
Both cases involved statements that prompted investigations into the
allegedly wrongful actions of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals found Rainier's Dairies quite persuasive. The
Crowell court stated: "The reasoning behind the decision in Rainier's
is sound and applicable to the case at bar. The threat of a civil action
in slander or libel would undoubtedly have a chilling effect on those
tempted to initiate legitimate investigations or inquiries into others'
supposed wrongdoings.
'230
In extending the absolute privilege afforded participants in judi-
cial proceedings to statements made prior to commencement of formal
proceedings, the court of appeals wisely adopted the reasoning of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Rainier's Dairies. The decision in Crow-
ell is a logical extension of absolute privilege and is consistent with
decisions in other jurisdictions that extend absolute privilege to a vari-




225. Id. at 563, 117 A.2d at 894.
226. Id. at 557, 177 A.2d at 891.
227. Id. at 557-58, 117 A.2d at 891.
228. Recall that only Herring's first affidavit has been addressed. See supra note
217. For a discussion of the importance of the affidavit being unsolicited, see Crowell v.
Herring, 301 S.C. 424, 431-32 n.3, 392 S.E.2d 464, 468 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam).
229. Crowell, 301 S.C. at 431-32, 392 S.E.2d at 468.
230. Id. at 432, 392 S.E.2d at 468.
231. See King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 104 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972) (letter written
by an attorney to the State Division of Real Estate complaining of broker's activities);
Mazanderan v. McGranery, 490 A.2d 180 (D.C. 1984) (letter written to Public Vehicles
Division of the D.C. Department of Mass Transportation complaining of abusive behav-
ior of taxi cab driver); Arundel Corp. v. Green, 75 Md. App. 77, 540 A.2d 815 (1988)
(letter written by an attorney to customers of plaintiff prior to the commencement of a
judicial proceeding); Sinnett v. Albert, 188 Neb. 176, 195 N.W.2d 506 (1972) (letter writ-
ten to Nebraska Bar Association alleging professional misconduct by an attorney);
Brown v. Central Say. Bank, 64 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (landlord's letter concern-
ing tenant's disruptive behavior); Baggott v. Hughes, 34 Ohio Misc. 63, 296 N.E.2d 696
(Ct. Comm. Pleas 1973) (letter by former client to state bar association alleging miscon-
duct by an attorney).
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X. NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES PRESUMED IN A PARENT'S ACTION FOR
THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD
In Self v. Goodrich213 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the jury may presume nonpecuniary damages in a parent's action
for the wrongful death of a minor child. The court concluded that this
presumption entitled the parent to have the issue of damages submit-
ted to the jury even though the parent presented no evidence of pecu-
niary loss.
233
Jason Dyshon Self was born prematurely in January 1984. Jason's
mother, the plaintiff, noticed signs of illness in early February. She
took Jason to his pediatrician, to a second doctor, to the emergency
room of the McLeod Regional Medical Center, and then back to his
pediatrician. Jason died on February 20 of bilateral
bronchopneumonia.
23 4
Jason's mother brought a wrongful death action against both the
Medical Center and Dr. Albert Goodrich, the emergency room physi-
cian who treated Jason at the Medical Center. Following the presenta-
tion of the evidence, both defendants moved for a directed verdict. The
trial court granted the motions because the plaintiff presented no evi-
dence of damages.
2 35
The court of appeals stated that the damages awarded in any
wrongful death action are those sustained by the beneficiaries of the
decedent and are not directed towards the value of the decedent's
life.236 The general elements of damages recoverable in a wrongful
death action are: "(1) pecuniary loss, (2) mental shock and suffering,
(3) wounded feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, (5) loss of companionship,
and (6) deprivation of the use and comfort of the intestate's society,
including the loss of his experience, knowledge, and judgment in man-
aging the affairs of himself and of his beneficiaries. '237
232. 300 S.C. 349, 387 S.E.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1989).
233. Id. at 353, 387 S.E.2d at 715.
234. Id. at 350, 387 S.E.2d at 713-14.
235. Id. at 351, 387 S.E.2d at 714.
236. Id., 387 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640
(1969)). Section 15-51-20 of the South Carolina Code states:
Every [wrongful death] action shall be for the benefit of the wife or husband
and child or children of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and,
if there be no such wife, husband, child or children, then for the benefit of the
parent or parents, and if there be none such, then for the benefit of the heirs of
the person whose death shall have been so caused.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
237. Self, 300 S.C. at 351, 387 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188
S.E.2d 470 (1972); Mishoe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938)).
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Contrary to the rule in other jurisdictions, 238 a South Carolina
court may not presume pecuniary loss in a parent's action for the
wrongful death of a minor child.239 The authorities relied on by the
Self court established, however, that nonpecuniary damages may be
presumed in a wrongful death action brought for the benefit of a
parent.
20
The Self court cited Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad241 and
Zorn v. Crawford24 2 for the proposition that nonpecuniary damages
may be presumed. Mock involved a wrongful death action brought on
behalf of the parents of the decedent, a twelve-year-old boy. The inti-
macy of the parent-child relationship permitted the assumption "that
[the decedent] was held in loving esteem by his parents and that they
experienced the natural feelings of grief in the loss of a loving son. '243
The court could not assume, however, that the decedent's parents suf-
fered a pecuniary loss.2 4 4 Nonetheless, the parents could recover dam-
ages for mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief and sor-
row, loss of companionship, and deprivation of the use and comfort of
the child's society.
245
238. The Self court stated, "The general rule is that a presumption of pecuniary loss
exists in favor of those legally entitled to services or support from the deceased." Id.
(citing 25A C.J.S. Death § 118 (1966)); accord Rositer v. Bob Toomey Truck Leasing,
Inc., 567 F.2d 938, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1977); Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 889, 895, 388
N.E.2d 906, 911 (1979); Mabe v. Gross, 167 Neb. 593, 597-99, 94 N.W.2d 12, 16 (1959).
The court also noted that the general rule presumes the pecuniary loss of a parent that
brings an action for the wrongful death of a minor child. Self, 300 S.C. at 351-52, 387
S.E.2d at 714 (citing 22A AM. Jum 2D Death § 442 (1988)). Although South Carolina does
not follow this extension, it allows a presumption of pecuniary loss when a wrongful
death action is brought on behalf of a widow or minor child. Brooks v. United Siates, 273
F. Supp. 619, 626 (D.S.C. 1967); Ellison v. Simmons, 238 S.C. 364, 370, 120 S.E.2d 209,
212 (1961).
239. Self, 300 S.C. at 352, 387 S.E.2d at 714-15.
240. Id., 387 S.E.2d at 715. The South Carolina Wrongful Death Act, S.C. COnE ANN.
§§ 15-51-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990), provides that "the jury may give
such damages ... as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such
death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be
brought." Id. § 15-51-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added). The South Carolina
Wrongful Death Act is a "general loss" statute. Annotation, Recovery of Damages for
Grief or Mental Anguish Resulting from Death of Child - Modern Cases, 45 A.L.R.4TH
234, 251 n.38 (1986). The courts have developed two interpretations of general loss
wrongful death statutes. Some jurisdictions, including South Carolina, permit parents to
recover damages for mental anguish and grief, id. at 249-53, while others do not allow
parents to recover, id. at 253-55.
241. 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 830 (1955).
242. 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969).
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The Self court concluded that Zorn echoed the reasoning of
Mock.246 Zorn involved the wrongful death of a fifteen-year-old girl.
The court found that the evidence did not show that the parents suf-
fered any pecuniary loss. 247 The court held, however, that although pe-
cuniary damages could not be presumed, the jury could consider the
nonpecuniary damages described in Mock.24" Based entirely on Mock
and Zorn, the Self court held that in a wrongful death action brought
on behalf of the parents of a minor child, the parents are entitled to
have the issue of nonpecuniary damages submitted to the jury.249
The Self court did not specifically limit its holding to a parent's
wrongful death action. However, two factors would allow a subsequent
court to conclude that nonpecuniary damages may be presumed only in
a parent's action for the wrongful death of a minor child.
First, the court of appeals relied solely on Mock and Zorn, two
cases that involved a parent's action for the wrongful death of a minor
child. Second, the Self court failed to address Nelson v. Charleston &
Western Carolina Railway.250 In Nelson the court held that neither
pecuniary nor nonpecuniary damages may be presumed in an action
brought on behalf of two brothers for the wrongful death of their sis-
ter.251 The court determined that collateral relatives252 must present
evidence that shows the nature of the relationship and the loss suffered
in order to recover either pecuniary or nonpecuniary damages. 253 Be-
cause the Self court did not address Nelson, the rule apparently re-
mains that a plaintiff that brings a wrongful death action on behalf of
a collateral relative must present evidence that proves an intimate re-
lationship to support an award of any damages.
Edward Frazier
246. Self v. Goodrich, 300 S.C. 349, 352, 387 S.E.2d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 1989).
247. Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 137, 165 S.E.2d 640, 645 (1969).
248. Id.
249. Self, 300 S.C. at 352, 387 S.E.2d at 715.
250. 231 S.C. 351, 98 S.E.2d 798 (1957).
251. Id. at 360-61, 98 S.E.2d at 801-02.
252. The court's examples indicate that a collateral relation is any relation except
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